Organizations play a critical role in any economy, undertaking numerous activities from production, to solving problems and generating new ideas and innovations. The Organizational Economics Workshop, held at The University of Sydney and jointly organised by The University of Sydney and The Australian National University, examines a broad range of economic issues relating to organizations, including: incentive contracts with external and internal parties and managerial remuneration; the organization of production, the use of labour and wage structures; the design of hierarchies; the allocation of decision making protocols within organizations; and the optimal allocation of ownership and alternative ownership structures. The Workshop started in 2007. The Workshop is a place for the presentation of both theoretical and empirical research into organizations.
The Organizational Economics Proceedings is a refereed journal of papers presented at the Workshop. The journal aims to be a forum the quick dissemination of new insights into the internal workings of organizations. Consequently, the Organizational Economics Proceedings also welcomes submissions of original research into organizations from researchers throughout the year. The journal does not require authors to forgo their copyright, so articles published in the Organizational Economics Proceedings can also be submitted and published in other journals.
Vol 1, No 1 (2012): 6th Annual Organizational Economics Workshop July 2012
Kieron Meagher, Andrew Wait, Richard Holden
Table of Contents
|Moral hazard with random participation|
|Participation and decision making in family firms|
|Bonnie Nguyen, Andrew Wait|
|Optimal Incentives in Problem Solving Teams|
|Kieron Meagher, Suraj Prasad|
|On cost overruns in procurement|
|Oleksii Birulin, Sergei Izmalkov|